Shielded: The Last Line of Cyber Defense
From NIST Standards to Action: A Year of PQC Migration
August 14, 2025
It’s been one year since NIST finalized its post‑quantum cryptography (PQC) standards, a milestone that sparked urgency across government, industry, and security leaders. In this special episode of Shielded: The Last Line of Cyber Defense, we revisit those early conversations about PQC migration to see how far we’ve come (and how far we still have to go). Host Johannes Lintzen is joined by experts from NIST, DHS, Cloudflare, Signal and leading hardware security companies to reflect on what’s working, what’s stalled, and why this migration can’t wait any longer.
One year ago, NIST released its long‑awaited post‑quantum cryptography standards, marking the official start of the migration to quantum‑safe security. It was the moment everyone had been “waiting for” but did it really kickstart the shift?

In this anniversary episode of Shielded: The Last Line of Cyber Defense, host Johannes Lintzen brings back some of the most important voices in the PQC conversation to revisit where we were, where we are, and where we need to go next:


Together, they deliver an unvarnished look at what’s changed in the 12 months since the standards were finalized and what still needs urgent attention.

What You'll Learn:

This is a rare, roundtable-style single-guest interview featuring voices from government, industry, and research in one conversation. If you need to understand not just why PQC migration matters but how to start, this is your playbook.

Your Roadmap to Post-Quantum Readiness:

[00:45] Step 1: Busting the “Quick Switch” Myth –  A Year Later
When NIST released its PQC standards last year, a lot of organizations exhaled, assuming the hard part was over. “Great,” they thought, “we’ll just swap in the new algorithms and move on.” But as Dustin Moody warned then, and has proven true over the past 12 months, this migration isn’t that simple. It’s not just a patch or an update; it’s a deep, sometimes painful overhaul of systems, processes, and mindsets. One year on, companies are discovering that waiting doesn’t make the work easier, it makes it messier. Key Question: One year in, are you still treating PQC migration as “future work,” or are you finally planning for the hard parts?

[03:31] Step 2: This Migration Isn’t Optional – And Year One Proved It
When Dr. Garfield Jones said, “This migration shouldn’t be optional,” it sounded like a wake‑up call. A year later, it’s not just a warning, it’s policy. Government memos, executive orders, and procurement rules have already started pushing companies to act, with federal agencies asking for cryptographic inventories and refusing to work with vendors who can’t demonstrate progress. The message is blunt: if your systems aren’t on the migration path, you could be locked out of contracts or entire markets. Year one proved the pressure is real, and year two will only raise the stakes. Key Question: Are you keeping pace with mandates, or will you watch opportunities dry up as compliance deadlines kick in?

[09:14] Step 3: Start With a Real Inventory – And Keep It Current
A year ago, Bas Westerbaan of Cloudflare told us that the first step in PQC migration was a thorough cryptographic inventory. That advice hasn’t changed but the past year has shown just how hard that job is in reality. Most organizations don’t have a full picture of where cryptography lives across their systems, what protocols are in use, or even which data is most sensitive. Without that map, every other decision becomes reactive, and every fix becomes a scramble. One year later, companies that didn’t start this work are already struggling to answer the simplest question: “Where do we even begin?” Key Question: Is your cryptographic inventory still a “to‑do,” or have you turned it into a living, updated map of risk?

[15:39] Step 4: Crypto Agility – From Concept to Year‑One Reality
A year ago, John Ray warned that if we hard‑coded PQC algorithms the way we did with RSA and ECC, we’d just be setting ourselves up for another trap. That warning has aged well. In the past year, crypto agility has shifted from an abstract “future‑proofing” buzzword into an urgent architectural reality. Companies are already seeing that systems without flexibility turn every new standard or algorithm change into an expensive nightmare. The smartest teams are designing infrastructure so the back‑end decides what algorithm to use, instead of forcing every application to be rebuilt. Key Question: Are you building systems that can adapt, or are you locking yourself into brittle ones you’ll regret later?

[18:17] Step 5: The Hardware Gap – Still a Ticking Clock
Mamta Gupta flagged it last year, and it’s even sharper now: hardware lives on a different timeline. Devices being shipped today are designed to last 10–15 years but the cryptography inside them might not even last five. Standards are evolving, threats are evolving faster, and anything rigid will be obsolete long before it’s retired. In year one, we’ve already seen how this mismatch turns into a headache for companies that didn’t build in an upgrade path. The clock is still ticking, and the gap isn’t closing on its own. Key Question: Are you designing hardware for the future, or are you shipping next year’s legacy problems?

[21:49] Step 6: Compliance – A Moving Target, Still Moving
One year on, compliance hasn’t “settled down” the way some expected. Frameworks like FIPS 140‑3 and certification rules are still evolving, and Cassie Crossley warns that algorithms considered safe today might not pass tomorrow’s tests. For companies that locked in too early, that means costly rework; for companies that waited, it means they still can’t sit still. This is why crypto agility isn’t just a “nice idea,”  it’s survival. PQC isn’t a single migration; it’s an ongoing process of adaptation. Key Question: One year after standards dropped, are you ready for the next round of compliance changes?

Episode Resources:


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Transcript

Johannes 0:00 Standards are here since August. Migration has started. In some cases, it's already in full swing. Now for organizations that are still waiting on the sidelines, what's the biggest myth or misconception about post quantum cryptography that you wish you could dispel right now? Welcome to Shielded, the last line of cyber defense by PQShield, the podcast where we are moving the conversation around post quantum cryptography from the why to the how. I'm Joe Linsen, your host, and I'm here to guide you through the challenges, innovations, and solutions that will help your organization stay secure in the quantum era. Let's future proof your defenses together.

Dustin Moody 0:45 I'd say a little bit earlier on, it was well, you don't have to do anything. You gotta just wait for the standard, so you could just kinda put it off. But the standards are here. And now maybe some people think, okay. We've got the standards. We'll just switch over, be a real easy, quick thing. We'll be done with this, and we can get on with our lives. But I don't believe it's going to end up being just a quick, easy, simple transition. It's gonna take a lot of preparation and effort and planning, and it will probably be a little bit painful. So I just say be ready for that.

Johannes 1:14 Maybe you can speak a bit more about that search for additional signature algorithms. I think there's 14 candidates that are currently still in the running.

Dustin Moody 1:24 Yeah. So when we announced the outcomes we would standardize, we did select three digital signature algorithms, and we think those will fit the majority of use cases. However, one of them okay. So of the three, two of them were based on what are called lattices, and one was based on a different idea called hash based signatures. Now we wanna make sure we have diversity of security assumptions because if someone were to ever come along and find a weakness or a new attack in, say, lattices and we couldn't use those algorithms, we need to have other algorithms ready to go. So we do have one algorithm like that. It it was based off of what's called Sphinx plus when it was standardized. We now call it SLHDSA, but its performance is not so good. It's kind of a bigger and slower than most people would be happy with. So while we have it and it's good, we wanted to take advantage of current and future research to try and come up with a more general purpose digital signature algorithm, not based on lattices, but that it would be better performing than Sphinx plus. So this is kind of another mini competition that we began, and it's been ongoing for a year or two now. We're in the second round. Currently, 14 signature algorithms are being evaluated. They come from a variety of different cryptographic ideas that mathematicians and computer scientists have been looking at. It'll continue to go for probably another two, three, four years before we select potentially one or two of these for standardization. And the main motivation again is finding something that can kind of be a backup to our lattice based algorithms and, hopefully, something that has a better signature size as well. g at. It'll continue to go for probably another two, three, four years before we select potentially one or two of these for standardization. And the main motivation again is finding something that can kind of be a backup to our lattice based algorithms and, hopefully, something that has a better signature size as well.

Johannes 3:01 There's a close collaboration between this and CISA. Despite the fact, I mean, regulations oftentimes have been a little bit of a double edged sword in cybersecurity. Sometimes they might accelerate adoption, but at other times, they might create a little bit of a bottleneck. So with NIST finalizing the standards and DHS rolling out PQC initiatives, what's your take on it? Do you see compliance as a driver or a potential roadblock for quantum migration or maybe both?

Dr. Garfield Jones 3:31 So I'm gonna just make sure this is abundantly clear. This migration shouldn't be optional. It's not something that you should take and be, uh, I can get it done later. As we kick the can down the road more and more, it becomes a bigger and bigger problem because then you're going to have a lot of privacy and confidentiality issues that you don't want. We don't know when a CRQC or cryptographically relevant on a computer is gonna come online, and the best thing to do is to be ahead of it. We are driving that kinda PQC migration. We've got these national memos, these national security memos. We've got executive orders. We've got OMB mandates. I don't think they're roadblocks. I think they're more of drivers. I think there's compliance within the federal space where we have to provide a annual inventory of our products, of our cryptography every year, which is what we need. But we need to be very aggressive on not only getting the inventory of the assets, but we also need to look at the data, which a lot of people forget. So we need to start inventorying our data. We need to start moving towards the migration activities that we talked about earlier in terms of getting the acquisition there. So I think we've got a lot of work to do, and missed finalizing those algorithms were huge and getting that because it really said, we're serious about this. And then the o and b memo that was released to the federal agencies was further indication that the government's serious about this. And you as an organization, if you wanted to work with the government or even anywhere on the outside and you have a non migrated system and you're looking at an organization who has a migrated system, you may not be able to work with them. After a while, it's gonna be so you might put yourself out of business by waiting. you as an organization, if you wanted to work with the government or even anywhere on the outside and you have a non migrated system and you're looking at an organization who has a migrated system, you may not be able to work with them. After a while, it's gonna be so you might put yourself out of business by waiting.

Johannes 5:26 Yeah. And that's probably one way of enforcing and making sure that organizations are following those timelines to say, well, if you're not taking these steps, then likely you won't be able to sell into those government agencies any longer in particular if they're part of the critical infrastructure sectors like finance, energy, telco. So do you anticipate for the mandatory PTC migration? You used the term, this shouldn't be optional. Right? This migration shouldn't be optional. So do you foresee any more enforcement on those deadlines?

Dr. Garfield Jones 5:59 I think I've seen very positive influences from the administration's past and present administrations on this. And that's a great thing because I think everyone understands the importance of this. And I'm hoping we are more aggressive on this with other mandates and pushing organizations to be more PQC ready. We can't stay in transition forever. The longer you stay in transition, the longer you're actually leaving vulnerabilities out to other countries, other organizations, not so nice organizations. ce of this. And I'm hoping we are more aggressive on this with other mandates and pushing organizations to be more PQC ready. We can't stay in transition forever. The longer you stay in transition, the longer you're actually leaving vulnerabilities out to other countries, other organizations, not so nice organizations.

Bas Westerbaan 6:39 I think the moment that NIST started this competition, it was a clear sign that this will be required at some point. Right? I mean, they wouldn't do this at this point if down the line. I mean, it's serious. What this pleasantly surprised me is how Dutch works is how thorough the US federal government has been in pursuing this migration. Their initial executive order then their post quantum bill, another executive order. They're really serious about this and about moving that. And I think that's a huge help in actually getting this on agenda, right, the interest there. And we see that there's other countries that are also actually differs quite a bit, but they're actually also some of them are quite in the front of thing in ahead of things. Germany is doing quite well. France. But that really helps also the not just the compliance, but also the requirements that federal agencies have to prefer products that are PQ ready. If there's a choice, they have to go for the PQ ready thing, and that really helps the markets move forward. Yes. So on the one hand, that's great. On the other hand, compliance can also be difficult in that compliance can especially with validation, FIPS validation and standards. Standards, you don't just have the standards of NIST itself. That's the downstream standard. They take time to write for people to get to put on paper. And fifth validation, that's made for time when things move slowly. Right? It can take a few years before module is validated. And there's a tension there with the timelines that we have now. Although I also see that, at least within the federal government, they are changing things up a little bit so that you can be a bit more agile, so having validation afterwards. So there are there are things to do here, but there's certainly attention and which people are aware of.

Johannes 8:30 Absolutely. I couldn't agree more. And I think Cloudflare certainly is leading the charge when it comes to the migrations. I'm actually just back from a conference with the payments and identity professionals. And again, I was reminded that many organizations are really only just waking up to what the urgency is to take a close look at post quantum cryptography and what it needs to be done within those organizations, I think you can really speak from a background of experience because you've already several years into the migration behind you. So I guess based on that experience, where do you start? Like, what is a good step? What what are the first few good steps that a company should and could take when they start that journey and start preparing for PQC?

Bas Westerbaan 9:14 So if you wake up, that's already very important. For sure.

Rolfe Schmidt 9:18 No. That I mean, once e, where do you start? Like, what is a good step? What what are the first few good steps that a company should and could take when they start that journey and start preparing for PQC?

Bas Westerbaan 9:14 So if you wake up, that's already very important. For sure.

Rolfe Schmidt 9:18 No. That I mean, once

Bas Westerbaan 9:20 we have executive level buy in that this is a thing that we should care about, that's already a huge deal of the work. So that's really an important first step. So from my work, I really think about this from a technical angle usually, but this is not as much as a technical problem, but it's more a process problem. It's a change management problem as well. Sorry. Life cycle management problem as well. That's, I think, a good way to look at it. So there's a lot to say here, but maybe to speak on some personal experience, we are in the first step, we are upgrading to post quantum encryption. What do you do? You have to figure out what do we need to upgrade. Of course, no one at the company knows everything that's running at the company. Right? You have no idea. So the first step is you ask each engineering team to try to figure out what software are you running, what connection are you running, what is urgent, what is less urgent, what are the steps required. Of course, this requires preparation. Right? You need to know you need to get an injection. And a part of that is also you need to have the expertise on board to help coach this because, for instance, one of the biggest this is not necessarily deep post quantum crypto expertise, but also stepping back.

Rolfe Schmidt 10:32 I can't say I'm sure what other organizations are doing. I imagine that people are doing things differently. And just like us, everybody's trying to figure out how to approach this. But one area where I suspect our constraints and our situation may sort of approach different is that we don't have a a team dedicated to the post quantum transition. We don't have any any individual that's leading a post quantum transition. The post quantum transition is part of our regular product development workflow. How does that work? Like, no matter what, quantum computation or not, we always have to be looking around us and asking, what are the biggest threats to our users' privacy? What tools do we have to combat those threats, and how are we gonna deploy those limited resources to use the tools and protect our users the best way we can no matter what. In that context too, when we look at the emergence of quantum computing, we don't see one giant monolithic threat, um, that needs to be addressed. We see threats all over our our application, all over our services. Um, some of those are big, and I'm sure we're gonna talk about some of the the biggest ones here in a bit. Some are small. Some have straightforward solutions. Some have reasonable solutions to figure out. Some we still don't know the answers to. But we have to take all of that together and continually assess, well, what's the best use of our resources? What do we solve first? And those solutions are gonna go into the product development roadmap just like anything else. ions. Some have reasonable solutions to figure out. Some we still don't know the answers to. But we have to take all of that together and continually assess, well, what's the best use of our resources? What do we solve first? And those solutions are gonna go into the product development roadmap just like anything else.

Johannes 11:49 So was it then, uh, maybe some of that trend analysis that you just explained? Was that what led you to approach harvest data protection as your first priority, or is there more to it?

Rolfe Schmidt 12:01 Yeah. Absolutely. I mean, they're like, let's step back to early twenty twenty three for that. Pretty standard. Yeah. This is when we decided we're going to go forward with our first Harvest Now, Crypt Later deployment. You know, what did the world look like then? Well, the entire Internet effectively was subject to Harvest Now, the Crypt Later attacks. An attacker could just collect all network data, have a quantum computer later decrypt everything we're saying, every website we visit and so on, but in particular, all of our users' messages, media, call contents, we're all subject to that. So, you know, when I said we ask these questions, like, what are the biggest threats to our users' privacy? That's a huge way. Okay. But but we're all we were pre standards at that point. But at that point, also, MLKEM, then known as Kyber, was already in round three of the NIST standardization process. It was based on years of of research. The standard itself had seen extensive scrutiny. There was a clear risk that it was gonna change before finalization. That happened to us. But did we feel like a a major risk that it was insecure or broken in some important way? Now we we didn't really see that. Also, we saw we could put together a protocol that was a small change for existing Handshake protocol, reasonably efficient, not a big engineering effort. And we could prove that even if Kyber was completely broken, that this new protocol wouldn't take away any security guarantees from our our correct users. So, like, no risk to our users' privacy, some risk to our our resource allocation. You know, that's kind of a no brainer. The amount of protection we could get for that cost is something we just felt we had to do. tely broken, that this new protocol wouldn't take away any security guarantees from our our correct users. So, like, no risk to our users' privacy, some risk to our our resource allocation. You know, that's kind of a no brainer. The amount of protection we could get for that cost is something we just felt we had to do.

John Ray 13:35 So the algorithms, we've been talking about them for a while, Dilithium, Kyber, Sphinx Plus, DAO Standardized. We wanted to wait until they were standardized because we wanna make sure we're interoperable with the rest of the world. If we implemented them in your prestandard form, then somebody might start using them, and they could get into trouble and have to change something later. So we've waited until they've been standardized to then add them to our product. The other aspect of this is what API are you going to call to use these upgrades? So we could have implemented something proprietary and in fact, we did to allow people to test out for us or them, says, yeah. So we created a custom functionality module is what we call that, that implemented the PQC algorithm so somebody could try them out with a proprietary API. But as part of this transition, which everybody has to work together on, we've have to work with OASIS, PKCS 11, Stance to be able to make those interoperable calls, so perform the crypto.

Johannes 14:41 So those, uh, functional module code, is that I think you call it FM code for sure. Is that once I customize that or I change it, do I break any of the certifications on the device, or how's that?

John Ray 14:55 Yeah. Because the certification is on the module and the firmware, which runs inside the module. If you customize that or change it, then it's considered new, and you need to go through a certification again.

Johannes 15:07 But you still have the physical bound. Yes.

John Ray 15:10 The physical boundary hasn't changed. The hardware hasn't changed, but the firmware running on that has changed. But there's legitimate reasons my why the certification is less important than the crypto that you can perform. And one reason why HSMs have this customizable capability is to add new algorithms.

Johannes 15:29 Is that would you say that the idea of being cryptographically agile is already sort of inherent to an HSM device because of that? ns my why the certification is less important than the crypto that you can perform. And one reason why HSMs have this customizable capability is to add new algorithms. Is that would you say that the idea of being cryptographically agile is already sort of inherent to an HSM device because of that?

John Ray 15:39 It depends on your definition. Right? Crypto agility, because that means a lot of different things. What does it mean to you? It depends on who's asking. We sometimes say HSMs have always been crypto agile because we offer many different algorithms, even more crypto agile because you can add them on the fly yourself. So some sovereign nations which have their own crypto, we can they can use our product in that nation by adding in that custom crypto themselves, that sovereign crypto themselves, which we couldn't put into the core firmware because then we would have trouble with FIPS, but if you want to take it a step further of crypto agility and this is tying into PQC and that, I don't know if inflection point is the right term, but it's making people think of what should we do now. We don't want to hard code in PQC crypto. If we do that, then we're in the same position we were with RSA and ECC. It's we need to rethink how we're going to do crypto. And so I don't think we're there yet, but I see us moving to a model where the end application will say sign and the back end infrastructure, centralized security infrastructure, whatever you wanna call it, will decide what algorithms. So it kinda changes the having to touch every application that performs crypto to that update all of those to a I just need to say I'm gonna sign something or I'm gonna encrypt something. And the back end, whether it's key management or whether it is an HSM, whether it's software of some sort is making the algorithm decision.

Johannes 17:23 So it's really rather a migration from a giving set of algorithms to a crypto agile architecture

Dr. Garfield Jones 17:32 Yes.

Johannes 17:32 That then uses the first set of angry side you hire. Mhmm. But then as that changes, I think they all agree that it will won't be as stable as we've been used to. But because you've designed it in a quick to agile way, now you're able to adapt query to two ways in it.

John Ray 17:49 When you look at the PQC algorithms, their evaluation is all theoretical Right. Because we don't have a quantum computer yet to test out the theory that says they're going to be safe. Well, we don't we don't know. We think we know. Smart people think we know. I think they're saying it so, but we don't really know. And there's gonna be some more agility, newer algorithms that we'll have to implement in the future. have a quantum computer yet to test out the theory that says they're going to be safe. Well, we don't we don't know. We think we know. Smart people think we know. I think they're saying it so, but we don't really know. And there's gonna be some more agility, newer algorithms that we'll have to implement in the future.

Mamta Gupta 18:17 The biggest challenge that I see is the disconnect between the speed of cryptographic evolution, which I just mentioned, is very slow because the data is so much that we need to protect. And also the life cycle of hardware, that is also very long. And then you have this threat that is evolving very fast. So implementation time lines, life cycle of hardware are on a completely different time line or a different scale, years and tens of years kind of scale. While the threat evolution and the requirement evolution is happening literally every two quarters. Every two quarters, either a new update comes on the threat or a new regulation comes or a new algorithm is identified or one leading algorithm is disqualified. So there is so much churn happening. So this dichotomy between or this disconnect between what needs to be done and the time it takes to do it versus how the requirements are changing and the threat is changing is the biggest challenge, and people are still not comprehending it. So it gives you a twofer. Right? So first of all, if your device is going to be in market for next ten years and you are subject to CNSA 2.0 requirements, you should have started yesterday because that device should have some PQC capability. Because by 2030, every device fielded a subject to CNSA two dot o mandate must have PQC protection. So that is one. That first, you've got to start very quickly if your device life cycles are longer. And then the other thing is that because it is evolving so fast, the threat is evolving so fast, the requirements are evolving so fast, You cannot afford to lock in something rigid, and that's where crypto agility comes in. That, okay, I will put in a PQC requirement, but if you lock it in an ASIC and that algorithm gets evolved or broken and a new version comes out or a new kind of threat comes out, then you are locked in with a useless protection. So this is where the traditional ways of doing things have to be rethought, and you have to think about crypto agility. Lot of people find agility and security oxymoronish, but this is what the need of the hour is.

Johannes 20:53 They need to merge. They need to come together. ocked in with a useless protection. So this is where the traditional ways of doing things have to be rethought, and you have to think about crypto agility. Lot of people find agility and security oxymoronish, but this is what the need of the hour is. They need to merge. They need to come together.

Mamta Gupta 20:56 Exactly. So that means something. You have to put in protection in something that will allow you to upgrade it later. And then I would also mention one more thing that the requirements and algorithms, their compliance and certification framework has not been decided. So where is this need for agility coming in? Why are we so worried about that these algorithms will be broken? It's because their compliance and certification frameworks are still evolving. They have not been released. So now you have algorithms that have been released that you are now mandated to follow, but you don't know whether they will pass their own certification or compliance or not. During that framework development, we might find vulnerabilities. So there is a widespread recognition in industry that we will see some evolution, hence, the need for crypto exhibits.

Johannes 21:49 So, you know, there's standards that are being discussed like FIPS one forty dash three or common criteria that I have a slightly different angle of looking at the compliance. But especially in critical infrastructure systems, how do you balance between the need for regulatory compliance and the reality that you just described? I mean, there are gonna be outdated systems, inevitably. So how do you balance those competing requirements? a slightly different angle of looking at the compliance. But especially in critical infrastructure systems, how do you balance between the need for regulatory compliance and the reality that you just described? I mean, there are gonna be outdated systems, inevitably. So how do you balance those competing requirements?

Cassie Crossley 22:15 Yeah. So forward thinking from a product standpoint, future ready products, that's where taking in updated regulations or standards that are more general. Like, I personally am not speaking for the whole company because I've never seen every single contract. A lot of the utilities will mention FIPS one forty. But a standard customer contract, they're not asking for it because it's not part of NERC SIP or something else like that. And so when it is specifically asked for, like, when you have to fill out NERC seven reports and so on and so forth as part of procurement or as ongoing assessments. And just in case anybody's not aware, from a utility standpoint, they have their own regulations. And part of those regulations cover the products that they use. And so we provide that transparency of which products will specifically say these models are at this level and this level because we understand, especially if they want to create a homogeneous environment. Like, I've always bought this one product, and as long as you sell it, I'm gonna stick with that even though you're three generations past that. And so they acquire waivers because they have additional defense in-depth and mitigations. So from a product standpoint, future ready, but being able to revise and update for regulations for existing products, especially when it's a device, takes a lot of time and requalification, lot of safety testing, and not just cybersecurity and such. And so those are always considered at the product level to see where it's required and such.

Johannes 23:56 Now you mentioned NERC SIP. Of course, for some of our listeners who who are not too versed with that environment, it's the National Electric Reliability Council Critical Infrastructure Protection, if I'm not mistaken.

Cassie Crossley 24:08 Yes. Something like that. And then there's FERC, which is the Federal Electrical Regulatory Commission. So FERC sort of man and so NERC works with working groups that we can become involved in, whereas FERC is the actual regulatory arm.

Johannes 24:23 And NERC sort of gives out guidelines and best practices?

Cassie Crossley 24:26 Yes. And it's an actual type of kind of regulation. They've got audit. So if they're a utility and asset owner is running that utility or whatever, but it's mainly bulk electrical system that it is over. And so there's audits that they have to go through, and it's quite involved. And there's different areas of that NERC critical infrastructure protection that goes into grids and all sorts of things, grid management. So those are the other ones. I mainly know the NERC seven and thirteen because those are the product specific ones that I get asked about. ve to go through, and it's quite involved. And there's different areas of that NERC critical infrastructure protection that goes into grids and all sorts of things, grid management. So those are the other ones. I mainly know the NERC seven and thirteen because those are the product specific ones that I get asked about.

Johannes 25:01 Right. And then the address generation, distribution networks, and that whole bulk of the power grid here in of course, in speaking of The US here. Well, that's great. Thanks for sharing all that, Cassie. This is exciting information there. A quantum era is already here. With the right tools, the right knowledge, and the right mindset, together, we can face it head on. To find out more about PQ Shield and how our cutting edge solutions can help you secure your data against the quantum threat, visit pqshield.com. Make sure to search for Shielded, the last line of cyber defense, in Apple podcasts, Spotify, or anywhere else you get your podcasts. Don't forget to click subscribe so you never miss an episode. On behalf of the team here at PQShield, thanks for listening.