Shielded: The Last Line of Cyber Defense
How to Build Your 12-Month Post-Quantum Strategy With NIST's Dustin Moody
April 3, 2025
The countdown has begun: by 2035, all public-key cryptography must be quantum-safe. Are you ready? In this episode of Shielded: The Last Line of Cyber Defense, host Johannes Lintzen welcomes Dustin Moody, the mathematician leading NIST's post-quantum cryptography standardization project, for an in-depth discussion on why organizations must act now. Moody shares essential insights into the 2035 implementation deadline, debunks common misconceptions, and provides actionable advice for building crypto-agile systems. Learn why the "harvest now, decrypt later" threat is imminent, how to assess your organization's quantum risk, and the key steps to take in the next 12 months to secure your digital future. Essential listening for cybersecurity leaders, architects, and decision-makers navigating the quantum security landscape.
With the 2035 deadline for post-quantum cryptography rapidly approaching, organizations must act immediately to ensure a smooth transition. In this episode of Shielded: The Last Line of Cyber Defense, host Johannes Lintzen speaks with Dustin Moody, a mathematician at NIST, to discuss the practical steps organizations should take to prepare for this monumental shift in cryptography. They explore the critical timeline, common challenges, and how the post-quantum cryptography migration can be effectively managed.

What You'll Learn:


Dustin Moody is a mathematician leading the post-quantum cryptography standardization project at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Since 2016, he has led one of the most consequential cryptographic initiatives of our time, selecting and standardizing algorithms that will secure digital systems against quantum threats. As the principal architect of NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standards, Moody has played a pivotal role in establishing the 2035 migration timeline and crafting crucial guidance for organizations transitioning to quantum-safe cryptography. His work bridges the gap between theoretical cryptography and practical implementation, helping organizations understand and prepare for the post-quantum era through crypto agility, risk assessment, and strategic planning. Moody’s expertise, combined with his collaborative approach, makes him a leading authority on securing digital infrastructure against emerging quantum threats.

The year 2035 might sound far away, but if you're a large organization, your migration timeline starts now. As Dustin Moody warns, this isn’t going to be a quick plug-and-play switch. The good news? NIST has laid out a clear roadmap. Here’s how to get started step by step.

Your Roadmap to Post-Quantum Readiness:

[03:55] Step 1: Appoint a PQC Taskforce and Map Your Migration -
2035 marks the end of your post-quantum transition, not the beginning. Large organizations may need a decade or more to migrate fully, meaning the planning must start immediately. Moody recommends building a dedicated internal team to lead the charge, assigning ownership, and developing a migration roadmap tailored to your systems and dependencies. The first foundational task is a cryptographic inventory, a deep dive into all the ways cryptography is used in your infrastructure. This includes both internally developed systems and supply chain components. Engaging with vendors, suppliers, and customers early ensures alignment and reduces friction later in the transition. Key Question: Have you built a dedicated team and started your roadmap, including a cryptographic inventory?

[13:22] Step 2: Design for Agility from Day One -
Crypto agility isn’t a future nice-to-have; it’s a current necessity. Organizations need the ability to adapt cryptographic algorithms over time, responding to new threats and evolving standards without disrupting live systems. NIST’s formal definition of crypto agility includes the flexibility to update cryptographic components across software, hardware, protocols, and infrastructure—seamlessly. Implementing agility now ensures you’re not locked into today’s choices and gives you options to respond quickly if vulnerabilities are discovered down the road. Key Question: Are your systems built to evolve or will they need to be rebuilt the next time the landscape shifts?

[18:24] Step 3: Protect Long-Lived Data from Quantum Exposure -
Quantum threats aren’t theoretical; they’re already impacting data security. According to Dustin, adversaries are actively collecting encrypted data today with the intent of decrypting it later, once quantum computing reaches maturity. This makes post-quantum readiness especially urgent for industries that manage data with long shelf lives—such as healthcare, finance, critical infrastructure, and national security systems. Even if your data is secure now, if it’s still sensitive a decade from now, it’s already vulnerable. While symmetric encryption like AES offers partial protection, the public-key encryption methods used to exchange keys are often the weakest link. Organizations must begin assessing where these vulnerabilities exist and how to mitigate them. Key Question: Are you still treating quantum threats as a future problem or are you protecting your data from being decrypted tomorrow?

[25:00] Step 4: Build Momentum with a 12-Month Action Plan -
You don’t need to solve everything in a year, but you do need to start. The next 12 months should be focused on building momentum: resourcing your PQC strategy, launching your inventory, and plugging into real-world guidance from initiatives like NIST’s National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence. Use this time to learn from early adopters, experiment safely, and begin aligning teams around risk, infrastructure, and timelines. The transition may span a decade, but your first steps start today. Key Question: What progress will your organization be able to show by this time next year?

Episode Resources:


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Transcript

Dustin Moody 0:00 We want people to take advantage of the fact that you're gonna need to be transitioning to the new post quantum algorithms to try and build in as much crypto agility so that in the future, you know, that'll be better off for you.

Johannes Lintzen 0:13 Welcome to Shielded, the last line of cyber defense by PQShield, the podcast where we are moving the conversation around post quantum cryptography from the why to the how. I'm Joe Lindson, your host, and I'm here to guide you through the challenges, innovations, and solutions that will help your organization stay secure in the quantum era. Let's future proof your defenses together. Listen to Dustin Moody, mathematician at NIST, as he explains why collaboration is going to be key, pun intended, in this massive transition. It will be painful, he says. But as we know, when you share your pain, it gets cut in half. NIST are providing some great resources to best practices and recommendations. Find out more as you listen to this episode of Shielded, the last line of cyber defense. Today, we are joined by Dustin Moody, the mathematician leading the post quantum cryptography standardization project at NIST, the National Institute of Standards in Technology. Since 2016, Dustin has spearheaded one of the most consequential cryptographic initiatives of our time, selecting the algorithms that will secure the world against the upcoming quantum threat. In this episode, we'll explore what the 2035 timeline really means, why waiting to migrate is a risk, and how NIST standards and those recommendations from agencies like NSA and CISA are reshaping the future of cybersecurity. We'll also talk about the crucial role of crypto agility and why the window for action is already closing. Dustin, welcome to Shielded, the last line of cyber defense. How are you today?

Dustin Moody 1:56 I'm doing great. Thanks for having me on to talk about this exciting topic.

Johannes Lintzen 2:01 Absolutely. It's our pleasure, and I'm looking forward to our conversation. So I guess looking at how some organizations are approaching the migration, it reminds me of that old saying that in the past, I was just procrastinating, but then I became a pro. And I think you've said this many times before, the time to procrastinate really is over. Standards are here since August of last year. Migration has started. In some cases, it's already in full swing. Now for organizations that are still waiting on the sidelines, what's the biggest myth or misconception about post quantum cryptography that you wish you could dispel right now? procrastinate really is over. Standards are here since August of last year. Migration has started. In some cases, it's already in full swing. Now for organizations that are still waiting on the sidelines, what's the biggest myth or misconception about post quantum cryptography that you wish you could dispel right now?

Dustin Moody 2:41 I'd say a little bit earlier on, it was, well, you don't have to do anything. You gotta just wait for the standard, so you could just kinda put it off. But the standards are here, and now maybe some people think, okay. We've got the standards. We'll just switch over, be a real easy, quick thing. We'll be done with this, and we can get on with our lives. But I don't believe it's going to end up being just a quick, easy, simple transition. It's gonna take a lot of preparation and effort and planning, and it will probably be a little bit painful. So I just say be ready for that.

Johannes Lintzen 3:10 Yeah. I think in one of the early interviews, maybe as far back as 2016, you were being quoted as saying this might take anywhere between ten to twenty years. So looking at the timeline that NIST is now suggesting and certainly, CNSA two point o also highlights 2035 as the date when QuantumSAFE algorithm should be fully deployed, we can really look at that as, is that the end of the journey? Certainly not the starting point. We see having standards available as the starting point. So given that until 2035, we have, what, ten years from now on, what should organizations be doing now to make sure they're ready to get go on that journey of the painful migration process as you just rightfully pointed out? ney? Certainly not the starting point. We see having standards available as the starting point. So given that until 2035, we have, what, ten years from now on, what should organizations be doing now to make sure they're ready to get go on that journey of the painful migration process as you just rightfully pointed out?

Dustin Moody 3:55 Yeah. There are definitely things that organizations should be doing. It will take time. We've seen in the past when you needed to migrate from one cryptographic algorithm to another. It can take ten to twenty years for large portions of industry or organizations to migrate. Some things that you can be looking at, we put out some guidance. We have a document called NISTR eight five four seven, great government name for you there, on the transition to PQC. And it's where we put out our proposed timelines where we say you need to deprecate your current public key algorithms by 2030 and transition by 2035 to the new post quantum ones. To make it a little easier, we also put out a fact sheet jointly with Sysen and NSA that's just kinda like a three page document that's a lot easier to understand. Some of the things that it talks about that you can do as your first steps. Number one, I'd say build a team and have somebody in charge of it and start putting together a road map for your organization. One of the first parts of that road map will be you need to find out exactly how and where you're using cryptography in your organization and in your applications, which turns out is a very, very complex inventory that you're going to do, and it's definitely not easy. You can start doing some risk assessments. You'll wanna start talking to vendors and your customers and your suppliers, making sure that they're aware of the PQC transition going on and finding out what their plans are so that you can be in sync with them. So those are some of the first things that you could be doing to begin your transition.

Johannes Lintzen 5:27 Yeah. And it's great to see that alignment. I think you rightfully pointed it out between NSA's, CNSA two point o guidelines for national security systems and CISA zero trust initiatives. And then last but not least, NIST PQC standards. I think it's great that you're sending this unified message. How important would you say is that collaboration, and how do you see the private sector responding? Is it with the right urgency that you're trying to convey with those signals coming out of the government? s. And then last but not least, NIST PQC standards. I think it's great that you're sending this unified message. How important would you say is that collaboration, and how do you see the private sector responding? Is it with the right urgency that you're trying to convey with those signals coming out of the government?

Dustin Moody 5:56 Yeah. We've been happy to coordinate and collaborate together so that we are putting out just one message. And if we weren't, it would be even more confusing, even more complex, and we don't want that. We have seen industry responding. There are many especially the kinda some of the bigger companies, bigger tech companies, and certain industries have been well aware of the process. Some of them have had researchers who have been involved with the standardization efforts. There still is a lot of room for more awareness, though. Some of the smaller companies and industry, I don't think that they know enough about PQC and the transition that's oncoming. We've been grateful, though, to have industry participating along the whole way, and they've given us lots of very good feedback as we've been evaluating and selecting the algorithms. They could tell us what things were working and what weren't and how would these algorithms fit into actual real world protocols in use, which was essential for us. And all this working together, we think, is really gonna be a good collaboration. The government can't do it all on its own. We need to buy products that are designed by industry, and so we wanna make sure everyone is on the same page to make the transition as smooth as we can.

Johannes Lintzen 7:03 Right. And I think wanna pick up on what you said about cryptographic asset inventory and how foundational that is as a challenge to even get started. And like you said, many organizations don't even have a visibility today of where their cryptography is and and where it's being used and how much of it is even within their own realm of influence versus the software supply chain. And I think software supply chain security has been talked and has been made a top priority under one of the executive orders as well. How do you see the new cryptographic schemes improving software integrity and improving the software supply chain? And how can organizations today maybe talk to their vendors to make sure they are aligned with those new PQC requirements? talked and has been made a top priority under one of the executive orders as well. How do you see the new cryptographic schemes improving software integrity and improving the software supply chain? And how can organizations today maybe talk to their vendors to make sure they are aligned with those new PQC requirements?

Dustin Moody 7:46 Well, I'll start by saying I'm more of a technical person and not a big supply chain expert, but it certainly is crucial that you're looking at everywhere you're using cryptography along the whole chain. You're going to be needing to use post quantum signatures, and you need to be aware that these signatures are larger than what you're used to. Right now, we use RSA signatures or ECTSA elliptic curve signatures, which are fairly small. If you transition to mldSA, the main algorithm that we've recommended, the signature size is an order of magnitude larger. So you're gonna have to be able to make sure that your applications can handle that or the protocols that you're working with, they can deal with that. So you definitely need to be looking at it internally as well as talking to your vendors and making sure that they're onboard and that they know that this transition needs to be done by 2035. And we're doing what we can to help with that. I mean, we selected MLDSA, and we do believe it's the main algorithm that we want people to use. Signatures are bigger than we'd like, so we are still evaluating some other signatures in a process we call the on ramp that could potentially be standardized in a few years that might have some smaller signature sizes. That said, we don't want you to put off your transition and hope that that's going to solve your problems. You need to begin the transition now.

Johannes Lintzen 9:03 Right. Yeah. Maybe you can speak a bit more about that search for additional signature algorithms. I think there's 14 candidates that are currently still in the running. you to put off your transition and hope that that's going to solve your problems. You need to begin the transition now. Right. Yeah. Maybe you can speak a bit more about that search for additional signature algorithms. I think there's 14 candidates that are currently still in the running.

Dustin Moody 9:13 Yeah. So when we announced the outcomes we would standardize, we did select three digital signature algorithms, and we think those will fit the majority of use cases. However, one of them okay. So of the three, two of them were based on what are called lattices, and one was based on a different idea called hash based signatures. Now we wanna make sure we have diversity of security assumptions because if someone were to ever come along and find a weakness or a new attack in, say, lattices and we couldn't use those algorithms, we need to have other algorithms ready to go. So we do have one algorithm like that. It it was based off of what's called Sphinx plus when it was standardized. We now call it SLHDSA, but its performance is not so good. It's kind of a bigger and slower than most people would be happy with. So while we have it and it's good, we wanted to take advantage of current and future research to try and come up with a more general purpose digital signature algorithm, not based on lattices, but that it would be better performing than Sphinx plus. So this is kind of another mini competition that we began, and it's been ongoing for a year or two now. We're in the second round. Currently, 14 signature algorithms are being evaluated. They come from a variety of different cryptographic ideas that mathematicians and computer scientists have been looking at. It'll continue to go for probably another two, three, four years before we select potentially one or two of these for standardization. And the main motivation again is finding something that can kind of be a backup to our lattice based algorithms and hopefully something that has a better signature size as well.

Johannes Lintzen 10:50 So that's the sort of the current state on the signature side of things. And I believe you've also recently chosen a second recommended algorithm for the key establishment side of the equation. Maybe you can speak to that a little bit as well. hing that has a better signature size as well. So that's the sort of the current state on the signature side of things. And I believe you've also recently chosen a second recommended algorithm for the key establishment side of the equation. Maybe you can speak to that a little bit as well.

Dustin Moody 11:03 Yeah. That's actually very recent. It was just, I think, about two weeks ago that we selected HQC as just the second key establishment algorithm or a CHEM, key encapsulation mechanism, that we're going to standardize. The first one we selected was now called ML Chem. It's a very good algorithm, and that's the primary one we want people to use. When we selected it, we, again, we wanted a backup algorithm ready, but we wanted a little bit more time to just evaluate the candidates that we were still studying. So we had another round, which is called the fourth round, where we were evaluating three or four of these algorithms, all based on other ideas that were not lattice based. And, eventually, we selected HQC. It's based on error correcting codes or code based cryptography. Its performance is not quite as good as MLKEM, but it's also not very far behind either. It's just a little bit bigger, almost as fast, but not quite. But security has been analyzed, and we feel confident in it. And we feel good with these two algorithms because they're both general purpose enough that we don't see the need at this time to do another process to try and find additional chems. So while we have it for signatures, for chems, we're content with this. And HGC will take a year or two to get standardized and finalized and published. And at that point, we'll be, uh, good on the chem side.

Johannes Lintzen 12:24 Now one thing that is certainly changing with the migration to those new algorithms is that in the past, we've had a relatively stable environment with really, on the asymmetric side, RSA and elliptic curve for what the past four or five decades, relatively stable. Obviously, listening to you, it becomes very clear that we're likely not going to have such a situation going forward, and that is why crypto agility is really important and comes into the picture. I think you, yourself, have emphasized it many times in recent discussions and there might have been a virtual meeting on the topic or is that upcoming?

Dustin Moody 13:01 Yeah. It's coming up in about a month. Yeah.

Johannes Lintzen 13:04 And so I think on the crypto agility topic, what does that mean in practice for organizations that are looking to get going on that journey of migrating towards ideally cryptographic agility within their environments? And why such a crucial concept? How is that evolving in today's threat landscape? ] Johannes Lintzen: And so I think on the crypto agility topic, what does that mean in practice for organizations that are looking to get going on that journey of migrating towards ideally cryptographic agility within their environments? And why such a crucial concept? How is that evolving in today's threat landscape?

Dustin Moody 13:22 Yeah. Crypto agility is certainly very, very important. And just to give a quick understanding of what it is, in essence, it's the idea that we're gonna continually need to transition or switch to different cryptographic algorithms as new research comes out or better algorithms are discovered. And so we want to be able to handle that switch as easily and seamless as possible without disruption to get new things in, but also to turn old things off. If something is broken or no longer has enough security, we wanna be able to turn that off as well. So that's the kind of the basic idea behind it. We have a more formal definition. We're currently doing kind of a deeper dive into crypto agility to help organizations, and we released a white paper. And we're holding a workshop in April where we're gonna have a lot more speakers come and talk on this topic. And kind of the definition that we give in that white paper is crypto agility describes the capabilities needed to replace and adapt cryptographic algorithms for protocols, applications, software, hardware, and infrastructures without interrupting the flow of a running system to achieve resiliency. And it turned out it's really depending on what you're doing or what organization you are or what layer you are. A lot of different aspects of crypt agility come to the surface. So it's quite a large topic bringing together a whole lot of things. And we want people to take advantage of the fact that you're gonna need to be transitioning to the new post quantum algorithms to try and build in as much crypto agility so that in the future, you know, that'll be better off for you.

Johannes Lintzen 14:57 Right. And it's great to also see the definition spanning not only algorithms, but also, like you said, libraries and even down to hardware, like, follow standards based implementations so that you're able to switch them out, like you said, as new research comes to light. Or typically, it will not be the algorithm itself that will be broken. It will rather be on the implementation, I suppose. Yep. So besides the full migration, oftentimes, hybrid cryptography is suggested as a way to migrate to transition, combining classical algorithms with most quantum ones. How do you view the role of hybrid schemes in that migration process? Are there situations where maybe relying on them might introduce even unnecessary risk? besides the full migration, oftentimes, hybrid cryptography is suggested as a way to migrate to transition, combining classical algorithms with most quantum ones. How do you view the role of hybrid schemes in that migration process? Are there situations where maybe relying on them might introduce even unnecessary risk?

Dustin Moody 15:41 Yeah. So hybrid has certainly been talked a lot about as a strategy for the migration. We've heard a lot of feedback from industry that they are interested in migrating in a hybrid fashion where they're going to be implementing more than one algorithm, an existing algorithm that we have a little bit more experience with its implementation and then adding in a quantum resistant algorithm. That certainly is a sensible strategy, and it makes sense. There are advantages and disadvantages of hybrid. Of course, if you're implementing two algorithms, there's gonna be performance hit compared to just implementing one. You're also going to be introducing more complexity. Whenever you combine two things, there's a chance that someone will find a way to come at it with a new angle. Kind of you can think of, like, downgrade attacks. So there are some potential reasons why you might not want to do hybrid. The advantages being security wise, you're in a good place. You're only vulnerable if both algorithms are broken or attacked in some way. So it's a pretty conservative way to do that until we get more experience with implementations, more implementations that are side channel protected, and we're and we're confident in that. So NIST really wants people to understand the advantages and the disadvantages. We have been a little bit agnostic. We're not saying that you need to do it or that you're required to do it. We think it makes sense for many, many people, but we also say that depending on your organization, your application, your use case, maybe it's not the best fit. So we want to encourage people that want to provide as much education as we can, and we wanna make sure to accommodate it so that you can get validation and testing done through our FIPS process. You can get FIPS validated if you're doing it in a hybrid fashion because that's very, very important to get that certification for a lot of products. ople that want to provide as much education as we can, and we wanna make sure to accommodate it so that you can get validation and testing done through our FIPS process. You can get FIPS validated if you're doing it in a hybrid fashion because that's very, very important to get that certification for a lot of products.

Johannes Lintzen 17:29 That's great. So, really, to get started today, you can take all the input, all the guidance that is available on the NIST website and others. Like you said, start by building a team that takes on that challenge. Build out cryptographic inventory. Find out all the places within your organization where cryptography is being used, and then really go in and do a risk assessment to determine where to get started. Like, what's the data within your systems that is most immediate at risk? Or what's the data that is susceptible to what we often hear about harvest now, decrypt later attacks, where basically data gets collected today even though it is encrypted, obviously. And then it will be decrypted once quantum computers become available in the future. From your perspective, how real would you say is that threat and and which industries and data types should be most concerned about the risk? er attacks, where basically data gets collected today even though it is encrypted, obviously. And then it will be decrypted once quantum computers become available in the future. From your perspective, how real would you say is that threat and and which industries and data types should be most concerned about the risk?

Dustin Moody 18:24 Yeah. So it's a very, very real threat. At NIST, we are part of the kind of the civilian side of government, but I've talked with others who deal more with national security, and they are very concerned about it. And they have said that it is a real attack, that it's not just something that could happen in the future, but that it's ongoing now, that they have seen our country's adversaries and enemies actively scooping up data with the idea that maybe in the future, they'll be able to unlock it and get access to that information. So it definitely is a real threat that you need to worry about today. Some industries where you need to be particularly thinking about this is anywhere you have information with a long shelf life that needs to be protected for a very long time. So you can think about things like health information. We obviously want that very private. Financial information, oftentimes, there's regulations or or rules that it has to be guarded for a certain number of years. National security systems in The US, I think they have to be protected for at least thirty year lifespans, as well as things like critical infrastructure where we really need to guarantee security so that bad actors can't get access to it and cause a lot of disruption in our life. So those are some of the places where you definitely need to be aware of the threat and start taking action. It seems to be more Harvest Now Decrypt Later is geared more towards the threat about encryption. Signatures, there is a threat there that if people can forge a signature, they may be able to have you if you do a software update, put on some software where it's not what you want and can introduce malware or viruses or take over things that way. But more of the concern currently seems to be about encryption because of these attacks. While we do want people to be aware and start taking action, we also don't wanna scare people too much in that much of the information that we have encrypted today is protected with symmetric algorithms like AES when it's at rest. And AES is vulnerable to quantum attacks from the quantum computer, so that does provide us some protection. That said, you use keys to encrypt and decrypt with AES. And how were those keys established? Were they established using public key cryptography? If so, you've got that vulnerability to worry about. So definitely a real threat, and you don't just wanna put this off into the future. hat does provide us some protection. That said, you use keys to encrypt and decrypt with AES. And how were those keys established? Were they established using public key cryptography? If so, you've got that vulnerability to worry about. So definitely a real threat, and you don't just wanna put this off into the future.

Johannes Lintzen 20:42 Right. So it's really looking at your data shelf life. How long is that data gonna be relevant? And then also, like you said, if we're looking at the critical infrastructure, how long is that device gonna be in the field? And if that's longer than the migration period, then certainly be good to get started today. And then I think it's interesting that you bring up this not just the encryption decryption challenge, but also with signatures, like forging signatures in the future where you might have an ownership document of the house you just bought. That certainly has a long shelf life as well. From the discussions that you're having, is there a sense on how much data has already been harvested, or is that anyone's guess?

Dustin Moody 21:25 I have no idea. I assume it's a lot because it's so easy to scoop up things and store it. I don't have any specific or information or details, but I imagine it's an awful lot.

Johannes Lintzen 21:34 So we've been talking a lot about, obviously, NIST and other US federal entities. You also get involved in international standards bodies like ISOs and others. Is there any concern that we're gonna end up with a too fragmented global landscape for post quantum standards? I mean, obviously, interoperability is a big key. So for multinational organizations, how can they navigate those differing time although timelines don't differ that much. I think NCSC just issued their guidance yesterday, and they too promote the 2035 timeline as sort of the endpoint here. So is there any risk that you see in fragmentation that might slow down adoption on a global scale? organizations, how can they navigate those differing time although timelines don't differ that much. I think NCSC just issued their guidance yesterday, and they too promote the 2035 timeline as sort of the endpoint here. So is there any risk that you see in fragmentation that might slow down adoption on a global scale?

Dustin Moody 22:17 Yeah. Definitely. I mean, this is not just a PQC concern, but anytime with cryptographic algorithms, if you have too many, there's concerns for interoperability and slower adoption. We were glad to see during the past, however long it's been, eight, nine years where we were working on the standardization. Most other organizations and standards bodies kind of paused what they were doing, participated, and collaborated with our NIST process so that we could make sure we were focused on getting strong algorithms out of it that we would all have confidence in. And I think that's what we are seeing for the most part. With the algorithms that we've selected, we have seen a lot of adoption and recommendations from other government agencies and other standards bodies that they wanna use the same algorithms. Now it's not completely %. We participate in ISO, which is an international standards organization. There are a few algorithms that are being standardized as part of a PQC effort there that are not the exact same ones that NIST selected. They were in our process, so they've been vetted and evaluated, and we believe they're secure algorithms. A little bit of a you know, if there aren't too many, it could potentially slow adoption. My prediction is that MLKEM and MLDSA will become very widespread and quickly adopted in most places. So I don't think it will end up slowing adoption too much, and there are different use cases. So we've seen with PQC that there's no silver bullet that's just a perfect drop in replacement everywhere. And so it's certainly understandable that one algorithm might perform better for your use case, and that makes sense. And that's fine. We're okay with that as long as you're using a secure algorithm.

Johannes Lintzen 23:55 So really you're seeing the role of NIST in providing a toolbox of many different algorithms to choose from that are well suited for certain use cases. Some might cater to small memory footprint. Some might be extremely fast. So I think that's sort of my takeaway from listening to you.

Dustin Moody 24:13 Yeah. As much as possible. Now it's not perfect. We don't have PQC algorithms that are lightweight, and it would be nice to have lightweight PQC. But researchers are working on that. Maybe we'll get there, but we're doing as much as we can at this point. t of my takeaway from listening to you. Yeah. As much as possible. Now it's not perfect. We don't have PQC algorithms that are lightweight, and it would be nice to have lightweight PQC. But researchers are working on that. Maybe we'll get there, but we're doing as much as we can at this point.

Johannes Lintzen 24:26 That was sort of in the classical realm. That was the challenge that elliptic curves were able to address when, you know, RSA had a too big of a footprint for resource constrained environments. So hopefully we'll see something similar in the not too distant future for those optimized small footprint devices. Now for organizations, which there are many, that are just now getting started towards quantum readiness, what is your ideal recommendation for where should the top priorities be for the next twelve months to get started?

Dustin Moody 25:00 Yeah. So I'd say number one, decide that this is a priority that you need to be doing this and putting resources to it. Some of the things we've already talked about, assemble your team and build your road map, get educated, read the documents, read the guidance that's coming out. Another great resource that we have is NIST has our National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence that's running the migration to PQC project that's partnered with several government agencies and around 40 or so companies from around the world that are working together to give guidance and to solve some of the problems with the transition. And they're sharing the lessons that they've learned in documents and reports that they put out. So I'd encourage you to take a look at that. And the other one I'd say is start on that inventory as quickly as you can so that you can start rooting out the vulnerable crypto and getting in the quantum resistant crypto. So that's a lot to do in twelve months. Probably unlikely you can get it all done in twelve months, but you wanna start on it.

Johannes Lintzen 25:57 Yeah. Even more reason to get started. Right?

Dustin Moody 25:59 Yes.

Johannes Lintzen 26:00 Well, fantastic, Dustin. This has been a great conversation. Thank you very much. Any final thoughts? I know you pointed out all the great information that's available in the NIST website already. Maybe there are chances to get involved with the NCCOE and the likes. Any final advice you would wanna give our listeners?

Dustin Moody 26:18 I'd just say with this transition coming up, it's not an excuse to not follow current best practice security, things that we already recommend and have in our standards. Be doing that hopefully already. And then as you transition to the new algorithms, we're here to help. Ask us questions if you need to. Talk to your vendors. Talk to other companies that do the same thing as you. The migration of PQC project, a lot of those companies might be normally competing, but right now, they're cooperating because we're only going to be successful if the transition is something everybody does. So jump in and do it. It's gonna be hard, but we gotta get it done. her companies that do the same thing as you. The migration of PQC project, a lot of those companies might be normally competing, but right now, they're cooperating because we're only going to be successful if the transition is something everybody does. So jump in and do it. It's gonna be hard, but we gotta get it done.

Johannes Lintzen 26:53 Great. Well, thank you so much again for your time. I know you have a busy schedule, safe travels, and thank you, Dustin.

Dustin Moody 27:00 Thank you. Thank you very much.

Johannes Lintzen 27:02 A quantum error is already here. With the right tools, the right knowledge, and the right mindset, together, we can face it head on. To find out more about PQ Shield and how our cutting edge solutions can help you secure your data against the quantum threat. Visit pqshield.com. Make sure to search for Shielded, the last line of cyber defense, in Apple podcasts, Spotify, or anywhere else you get your podcasts. Don't forget to click subscribe so you never miss an episode. On behalf of the team here at PQShield, thanks for listening.